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An appreciation and practice of the fragment is a 
feature of all European Romanticism, but it was in 
early German (or ‘Jena’) Romanticism, and most of 
all in the work of Friedrich Schlegel, that the concept 
of ‘the fragment’ was philosophically determined. 
Indeed, the fragment has been called ‘the central 
philosophical concept of early German Romanti-
cism’.1 As both concept and form the (early German 
Romantic) fragment is at once philosophical and 
literary. It is the expression of both a philosophical 
limit and its surpassing, in a form made new by its 
self-conscious theoretical investiture. To the extent 
that the Romantic idea of the fragment developed 
out of a more general fascination with ruins, it is 
also tied in its origins to the cultural appreciation of 
archeology and architecture and of all the forms of 
ancient material and artistic culture that survive as 
‘fragments’ of things (manuscripts, vases, pots, and 
so on) or of those cultures themselves. 
The cultural and intellectual context of the emer-
gence of the Romantic idea of the fragment is thus 
multiply determined and its field is certainly not 
restricted to what we would today call a ‘discipline’. 
Nevertheless, in Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-
Luc Nancy’s influential study The Literary Absolute 
the interpretation of the significance of the fragment 
form is folded into the category of ‘literature’. For 
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, Jena Romanticism is 
‘theoretical romanticism … the inauguration of the 
theoretical project in literature’, perhaps even the 
inauguration of ‘literature’ itself.2 And if ‘literature or 
literary theory’ is ‘the privileged locus of expression’ 
of (economic, social, moral, religious, political) crisis, 
the fragment is its privileged form. ‘Literature’ in this 
sense may not be a strictly disciplinary term, yet the 
idea of the fragment is nonetheless confined in The 
Literary Absolute to its embrace.3
One of Schlegel’s Athenaeum Fragments suggests 
that the idea of the ‘fragment’ refers to more than 
the ‘genre’ of the literary fragment. Schlegel writes: 
A dialogue is a chain or garland of fragments. An 
exchange of letters is a dialogue on a larger scale, 
and memoirs constitute a system of fragments. 
But as yet no genre exists that is fragmentary both 
in form and content, simultaneously completely 
subjective and individual, and completely objec-
tive and like a necessary part in a system of all the 
sciences.4 
In fact, the very specificity of the concept of the 
fragment (opposed, as we shall see, to the ‘empirical’ 
concept of the merely broken-off bit, das Bruchstück) 
entails its independence from any given form of 
instantiation. Given this situation, I propose here that 
the conceptual logic of the fragment is also at work 
in the dream. More specifically, with the concept of 
the fragment one of the two competing characteriza-
tions of the dream in Freud’s The Interpretation of 
Dreams is illuminated and made compelling. Freud 
equivocates between, on the one hand, a theory in 
which a dream is the hallucinated fulfilment of a 
perfectly coherent and rational wish, discoverable 
through interpretation; and, on the other, a theory in 
which a dream is the fragmentary form of appearance 
of the incalculable, effectively infinite relations of the 
totality of psychic activity and its ‘outside’ and of the 
‘relation’ to the unknowable. Reading The Interpreta-
tion of Dreams from the standpoint of the specificity 
of the Romantic concept of the fragment brings the 
second of these characterizations to the fore. It also 
functions critically in relation to Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy’s de facto restriction of the concept of 
the fragment to the domain of ‘literature’ (in its 
most expanded sense), not least because the dream 
cuts across the distinctions that for Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy specify the philosophical concept of the 
fragment. The concept of the fragment emerges from 
this encounter with The Interpretation of Dreams in 
its full transdisciplinary significance. But how does 
psychoanalysis emerge from its encounter with the 
Romantic fragment?
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What is the Romantic fragment? If, as numerous 
authors point out,5 people were writing fragments 
and calling them such long before the Romantic 
appropriation of the form, what distinguishes the 
specifically Romantic version of the practice? (This 
is, inevitably, as much a product of our contemporary 
understanding of this historical-intellectual moment 
of conceptual production as the product of that 
moment itself.) It lies primarily in the fact of its being 
posited as ‘an artistic solution to a philosophical 
problem’.6 For the purposes of this article, which 
has no pretension to the construction of a philo-
sophical genealogy of the concept, suffice it to say 
that this philosophical problem can be glossed as the 
problem of the ‘presentation of the unpresentable’, 
as Novalis put it,7 together with (what may in fact be 
the same thing) that of the simultaneous necessity 
and impossibility of the system, or at least of the 
systematic horizon of knowledge. Both problems, 
and the Romantic response to them, can be seen as 
deriving from, and in reaction to, the understanding 
of the limits of knowledge and self-knowledge in 
Kant’s transcendental idealism. For Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy, this primarily concerns the consequences 
of Kant’s articulation of the ‘I’ as an empty form, a 
transcendental function of unity or synthesis which 
is ‘unpresentable to itself ’,8 because it is not a possible 
object of any original intuition. According to Kant, 
the subject knows itself only as it appears to itself – 
not as it is in itself – hence as mediated by the pure 
form of intuition of time and the synthetic unities 
of its objects. Kant grants the subject the speculative 
thought of the infinite and the unconditioned with 
the Idea of reason, but not its possible ‘presenta-
tion’ (Darstellung) or representation in intuition. For 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, this ‘hiatus introduced 
at the heart of the subject’ frustrates the desire for a 
system of the totality of knowledge, for lack of any 
originary intuition to ground or organize it.9 The 
subject understood in this way thus both demands 
systematicity (that is, systematicity is a demand of 
reason) and yet also makes the system impossible. 
The system, as the totality of objective knowledge, is 
demanded by the subject whilst rendered impossible 
by it, since its own subjectivity resists incorporation 
into objectivity.
Following Walter Benjamin’s lead, Manfred Frank, 
in his detailed analysis of the philosophy of early 
German Romanticism, stresses also its character as 
a response (especially from Novalis and Schlegel) to 
Fichte’s attempt to address the problem opened up by 
Kant; that is, Fichte’s attempt to ground the system 
of knowledge in the self-presentation of the ‘I’. Frank 
argues that the early German Romantics, sceptical 
(for good philosophical reasons) of the possibility 
of a philosophy based on an absolute first principle, 
foregrounded the conditioned and finite nature of 
our means of obtaining knowledge.10 This was not 
to reject the Absolute as the horizon of knowledge, 
nor to deny the ‘longing for the infinite’, but to con-
ceive them as regulative principles, with the goal 
of philosophy as the infinite approximation of an 
ever-incomplete absolute knowledge, or the infinite 
progression towards the absolute.11
The difference in emphases between Frank and 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy reflect their very dif-
ferent aims and interests. Frank provides a detailed 
philosophical history of early German Romanticism, 
in a study that looks mainly to the past; whereas 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy are more interested in 
the Romantic invention of ‘literature’, and thus, in 
a sense, with the futures of Romanticism. Never-
theless, the same point emerges from both books: the 
problem of the presentation of the unpresentable, and 
the need for philosophy, understood in its new-found 
disciplinary autonomy, to cede to ‘art’ (or ‘poetry’, 
or ‘literature’) or to become ‘art’ (or ‘poetry’, or ‘lit-
erature’) in acknowledging this. In Frank’s account 
art ‘alludes to’ (andeuten) what cannot be presented 
conceptually or sensibly. Art alludes to ‘that which 
it does not succeed in saying’, which Schlegel calls 
‘saying-more’ (mehr-sagen) than it says.12 Appearing 
only at the end of Frank’s book, this cannot help but 
seem to be a ‘supplement’ to philosophy, whereas for 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy literature (or ‘literary 
theory’) is Romantic philosophy, a ‘total’ enterprise, 
in which the concept of the fragment – the form of 
‘saying-more’ – plays a correspondingly more central 
role.13 So what is this concept of the fragment, exactly?
The answer is complicated but may be distilled 
into three main points. First, the Romantic concept 
of the fragment (for which we may use the same word 
in German: das Fragment), as a constructed work, is 
distinguished from a mere broken piece. Some make 
this distinction terminologically, opposing ‘fragment’ 
to das Bruchstück. Although this terminological dis-
tinction is not a consistent philological feature of 
early German Romantic texts themselves, it is useful. 
If the Bruchstück is ‘the detached piece pure and 
simple … the residue of a broken ensemble’,14 the 
fragment is in itself complete qua form, while at 
the same time invoking an essential incompleteness. 
The archeological find of a ‘fragment’ of pottery is a 
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Bruchstück in so far as the archeologist searches for 
the other missing pieces, hoping to reunite it with the 
other bits to re-create the original whole. Sappho’s 
fragments 64A and B are like this, to the extent that 
they are only what is left, bereft of what would allow 
us to discern the meaning in them: ‘ … goat … for 
comrades … … of children … … … to gods … ugly … … 
Muse’.15 We are left with only a fraction (ein Bruch), a 
potentially countable percentage of the whole.
Second, the fragment as ‘a determinate and 
deliberate statement, assuming or transfiguring the 
accidental and involuntary aspects of fragmentation’, 
aiming at ‘fragmentation for its own sake’, is to be 
distinguished from the unfinished draft ‘struck by 
incompletion’.16 Elizabeth Wanning Harries describes 
this difference as that between ‘the involuntary frag-
ment, cut off by death or by the writer’s inability 
to finish the poem’ and ‘the deliberate or planned 
fragment.’17 Third, the fragment (or, perhaps, the 
fragmentary form) is to be distinguished from the 
literary genre of the fragment, the latter closely tied 
to the tradition of the aperçue, the pensée and the 
aphorism. (Most of Schlegel’s ‘Fragments’ are in fact 
examples of the literary genre of the fragment, and 
not practices of the fragmentary form.) However, any 
of these – the Bruchstück, the involuntary fragment, 
examples of the literary genre of the fragment – 
can become ‘fragments’ in the literary-philosophical 
sense, and indeed, especially in the case of ancient 
works, have become so.18 As Robert Brain puts it: ‘If 
a merely broken piece did not qualify as a fragment, 
it nevertheless offered great potential if its accidental 
or involuntary character could be transfigured into a 
determinate and deliberate statement of fragmenta-
tion.’19 ‘Goat for comrades of children; to gods – ugly 
Muse.’
The fragment in its fullest sense is the idea of 
something complete in itself and yet essentially 
incomplete. Each fragment, according to Schlegel, 
is a self-sufficient form (indeed it must be ‘entirely 
isolated from the surrounding world’).20 It is in itself a 
totality in its detached individuality, but, at the same 
time, the partiality of its content and its ineliminable 
reference to incompletion mark it as ‘the exergue 
of the total, infinite work’.21 It is, as Schlegel says, a 
‘project’: 
A project is a subjective embryo of a developing 
object. A perfect project should be at once com-
pletely subjective and completely objective, should 
be an indivisible and living individual. … The 
feeling for projects – which one might call frag-
ments of the future – is distinguishable from the 
feeling for fragments of the past only by its direc-
tion: progressive in the former, regressive in the 
latter.22 
The fragment projects the system; its finitude is 
a negative reference to the infinite;23 its completion 
carries within it a reference to incompletion. This is 
the sense in which the form of the fragment is the 
presentation of the unpresentable – Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy’s ‘literary absolute’ – and Schlegel’s generic 
name for the fragmentary work in this sense is poetry 
(Poesie), beneath which lurks, as Peter Osborne writes, 
‘the generic concept of art’.24
‘Literature’ and ‘poetry’ are not, as has already 
been noted, disciplinary terms, and they do not refer 
to specific genres. But even in their expanded senses 
they cannot claim ‘the fragment’ for themselves. 
The fragment is in principle – it must be – a trans-
disciplinary concept. Schlegel, Novalis and others 
gestured towards this, whilst remaining primarily 
interested in poetry/literature. Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy gesture towards this gesture but only consider 
the fragment as integral to ‘The Theory of Literature 
in German Romanticism’ (the subtitle of The Literary 
Absolute). Frank, too, treats of the fragment only in 
the context of the ‘theory of art’. However, freed from 
its association with poetry/literature/art, the idea of 
the fragment itself functions generically, as a produc-
tive interpretative concept. Accordingly, dreams can 
be understood as fragments, in the specific sense 
outlined above, and the deployment of the idea of 
the fragment in the interpretation of Freud’s theory 
of dreams allows the transdisciplinarity of psycho-
analysis itself to emerge.
From fragments of dreams  
to dreams as fragments
Throughout The Interpretation of Dreams Freud notes, 
and notes others noting, the phenomenon of the only-
fragmentary nature of the recollection of dreams 
and their fragmentary contents. But this is precisely 
not where the Romantic concept of the fragment 
has any purchase in the theory of dreams. Although 
Strachey’s English translation uses the words ‘frag-
ment’ and ‘fragmentary’ throughout, Freud never 
uses Fragment or fragmentarisch, but rather a number 
of other words and phrases which, in relation to the 
Romantic theory, can be used precisely to distinguish 
empirical forms of unfinishedness from the specific 
concept of the fragment. This is most insistent in the 
first chapter, ‘The Scientific Literature Dealing with 
the Problem of Dreams’, in which Freud builds up a 
picture of an extensive, mostly eighteenth-century 
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German, literature notable for its absolutely contra-
dictory claims about the nature and status of dreams, 
particularly as concerns their relation to waking life 
(which, for Freud, at this early stage in the book, is 
sometimes equated with ‘reality’). Freud’s aim is to 
show that dreams are psychical structures that have 
a meaning and ‘can be inserted at an assignable point 
in the mental activities of waking life’ (IV, 1).25 After 
a quick survey of divinatory dream interpretation in 
the ancient (mainly Greek) world and in the Middle 
Ages, Freud shows that the dominant tendency in 
the modern literature is either to treat dreams as 
the worthless excretions of the benumbed sleeping 
mind, or as the fanciful (and essentially meaning-
less, if sometimes pleasant or relaxing) play of the 
imagination freed from the cognitive constraints of 
the understanding or of reason.
Within these tendencies, the fragmentary nature 
of the dream content is associated with both worth-
lessness and meaninglessness. Especially where the 
process of secondary revision has failed (that is, 
where both in the dream and in its remembering 
and narration no effort has been made to make it 
seem coherent), ‘we find ourselves helplessly face to 
face with a meaningless heap of fragmentary material 
[einem sinnlosen Haufen von Inhaltsbrocken]’ (V, 490). 
The often absurd nature of dreams is later also said 
to be one of the main arguments used in favour of 
regarding dreams as ‘the meaningless product of a 
reduced and fragmentary [reduzierten und zerbrökelten] 
mental activity’ (V, 426), using only ‘a functionally 
restricted fragment [Bruchteil] of the mind’s faculties’ 
(V, 506). One of the most frequently cited sources, 
F.W. Hidebrandt’s Der Traum und seine Verwerthung 
für’s Leben (1875), is quoted as wondering over the fact 
that ‘dreams derive their elements not from major 
and stirring events … but from the worthless frag-
ments [den wertlosen Brocken], one might say, of what 
has been recently experienced’ (IV, 18). L. Strümpell 
is similarly cited noting the derivation of dream 
components from what is unimportant and trivial, 
‘odd fragments’ [kleine Stücke] of what one has read, 
and so on’ (IV, 19). This fact, which Freud glosses as 
‘the remarkable preference shown by the memory in 
dreams for indifferent … elements in waking experi-
ence’ (IV, 19), is one of the central puzzles investigated 
in The Interpretation of Dreams. What is more, even 
these indifferent experiences are not reproduced in 
their entirety (or unaltered): ‘Dreams yield no more 
than fragments [nur Bruchstücke] of reproductions; 
and this is so general a rule that theoretical consid-
erations may be based on it’ (IV, 21).
As well as the broken and bitty nature of what 
makes up the (manifest) content of dreams, Freud 
notes the view that, on waking, one remembers only 
a bit of it. To some extent Freud agrees that ‘the 
dream which we remember when we wake up [is] 
a fragmentary remnant of the total dream-work 
[bloß ein Rest der gesamten Traumarbeit]’ (IV, 279). 
This seems to be suggested by the extent of the 
latent dream thoughts uncovered in interpretation, 
as compared with the short and often telegraphic 
nature of what the dreamer is able to report. For 
Freud, though, the dream itself may well actually be 
short and telegraphic; the discrepancy between this 
and the extent of the dream-thoughts is the result 
of the process of condensation. Granted that ‘only a 
small minority of all the dream-thoughts revealed are 
represented in the dream by one of their ideational 
elements’, it is not the case that the dream is ‘a highly 
incomplete and fragmentary version [eine höchst un-
vollständige und lückenhafte Wiedergabe] of them [the 
dream-thoughts]’ (IV, 281). The ‘different portions 
[Stücke]’ of the manifold and complicated structure 
of dream-thoughts, which are in fact generally trains 
of thought, ‘invariably’ accompanied by their contra-
dictory counterparts, are, as it were, squashed into 
the short dream through the process of condensation: 
the whole mass of these dream-thoughts is brought 
under the pressure of the dream-work, and its ele-
ments are turned about [die Stücke gedreht], broken 
into fragments and jammed together [zerbröckelt 
und zusammengeschoben] – almost like pack ice. 
(IV, 312) 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the forgetting of 
dreams is the result of their being repressed, it is the 
case that we often ‘remember nothing but a single 
fragment [eine Bruchstück]’ and ‘there is every reason 
to suspect that our memory of dreams is not only 
fragmentary [lükkenhaft] but positively inaccurate 
and falsified’ (V, 512).
As well as references to the ‘fragmentary’ nature of 
the dream content, the ‘fragmentary’ function of the 
psychical apparatus in the process of dreaming and 
the ‘fragmentary’ nature of what is remembered of 
the dream, Freud also presents the account of certain 
dreams that are subject to analysis in The Interpreta-
tion of Dreams as ‘fragments’. The description of these 
dreams begins: ‘(Bruchstück)…’, indicating that he is 
choosing to tell us only a part (a percentage) of what 
he remembers.26 But in all cases, as Freud’s own choice 
of vocabulary indicates (but Strachey’s translation 
obscures), these references to parts, pieces, fractions, 
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broken pieces, things full of holes, are precisely not, 
at least as Freud presents them, a point of contact with 
the Romantic concept of the fragment. Rather, it is 
the phenomenon of the dream itself – whatever the 
nature of its contents and whatever we remember of 
it – that bears interpretation in terms of the concept 
of the fragment. The explanation of this (and the 
justification of the claim) lies in an elucidation of 
the two different – and conflicting – accounts of the 
possibilities for dream interpretation that sit side by 
side in The Interpretation of Dreams: that based on the 
archaeological model and that in which the dream 
itself (as a finished piece, rather than a collection of 
broken-up bits) is understood as a fragment in the 
Romantic sense.
The archaeological model of psychoanalysis was 
described as early as 1896, in ‘The Aetiology of 
Hysteria’:
Imagine that an explorer arrives in a little-known 
region where his interest is aroused by an expanse 
of ruins, with remains of walls [Mauerresten], 
fragments of columns [Bruchstücken von Säulen], 
and tablets with half-effaced and unreadable 
inscriptions … he may start upon the ruins, clear 
away the rubbish, and, beginning from the visible 
remains, uncover what is buried … the ruined walls 
are part of the ramparts of a palace or a treasure-
house; the fragments of columns [Säulentrümmern] 
can be filled out into a temple. (III, 192)27
The influence of this model on Freud’s conception of 
dream interpretation emerges in the second chapter 
(‘The Method of Interpreting Dreams: Analysis of 
a Specimen Dream)’ and follows on closely from 
the first major conclusion of The Interpretation of 
Dreams. Freud distinguishes psychoanalytic dream 
interpretation from the two methods practised in 
the ‘lay world’28 – symbolic dream interpretation 
(which ‘considers the content of the dream as whole 
and seeks to replace it by another content which 
is intelligible and in certain respects analogous to 
the original one’) and the ‘decoding method’ (which 
‘treats dreams as a kind of cryptography in which 
each sign can be translated into another sign having 
a known meaning, in accordance with a fixed key’).
In Chapter II the psychoanalytic method is dem-
onstrated by example, with the analysis of what has 
come to be known as the famous dream (one of 
Freud’s own) of ‘Irma’s Injection’. Picking up on suc-
cessive parts of the dream, Freud unravels a series of 
interlocking associations that, taken together, seem 
to reveal that the dream represents ‘a particular state 
of affairs such as I [Freud] should have wished it to 
be. Thus its content was the fulfilment of a wish and 
its motive was a wish’ (IV, 188–9). The defence of the 
generalization of this conclusion (‘a dream is the fulfil-
ment of a wish’, IV, 121; refined, at the end of chapter 
IV, as the claim that ‘a dream is a (disguised) fulfilment 
of a (suppressed or repressed) wish’, IV, 161) occupies 
much of the next two chapters of the book, and gives 
us the received view of Freud’s theory of dreams. Psy-
choanalytic dream interpretation is presented as the 
search for the wish of which the dream is a fulfilment, 
‘the actual wish [der Wunsch selbst]’ (IV, 191), the ‘true 
content’ (eigentlichen Inhalt) (IV, 215), the ‘essential 
dream-thoughts’ (wesentlichen Traumgedanken) (IV, 
311) which are never absurd (IV, 444) and which arise 
‘through entirely normal mental activity’ (V, 592) – 
the perfectly intelligible, rational kernel of the dream 
which can become an object of knowledge.
Understood in this way, and armed with the dis-
tinction between manifest and latent content, the 
dream furnishes the interpreter with the pieces of a 
picture puzzle or rebus (Bilderrätsel), or with cryptic 
clues, as Freud explains in the opening of chapter VI, 
thinking perhaps of the Rosetta Stone:
The dream-thoughts [latent content] and the 
dream-content [manifest content] are presented to 
us like two different versions of the same subject-
matter in two different languages. Or, more 
properly, the dream-content seems like a tran-
script of the dream-thoughts into another mode 
of expression, whose characters and syntactic laws 
it is our business to discover by comparing the 
original and the translation. The dream-thoughts 
are immediately comprehensible, as soon as we 
have learnt them. The dream-content, on the other 
hand, is expressed as it were in a pictographic 
script [Bildershrift], the characters of which have to 
be transposed individually into the language of the 
dream-thoughts. (IV, 277)
Even when pieces of the puzzle are missing – 
as they generally are, because of the forgetting of 
dreams – the archeological reconstruction of the true 
meaning is still possible:
It is often possible by means of analysis to restore 
all that has been lost by the forgetting of the 
dream’s content; at least, in quite a number of 
cases one can reconstruct from a single remaining 
fragment [einem einzelnen stehengebliebenen Broken] 
not, it is true, the dream – which is in any case 
a matter of no importance – but all the dream-
thoughts. (IV, 517)
Thus the explicit descriptions of the ‘fragmentary’ 
nature of the dream content and the ‘fragmentary’ 
nature of what is remembered of the dream refer, 
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according to the archaeological model, to what are 
in themselves meaningless bits and pieces (Bruch-
stücke) requiring the reconstruction of the whole 
to which they belong. And on this model (cross-
ing with the metaphor of ideal translation) what is 
reconstructed is a singular meaning (the wish, or the 
dream-thoughts). The unknowable, the unconscious, 
is rendered knowable. End of story.
However, a strong countercurrent runs through 
The Interpretation of Dreams. For as much as Freud 
sticks to the idea that ‘a dream is the fulfilment 
of a wish’, he also stresses the innumerable chains 
of associations ‘reaching back to earliest childhood’ 
that ‘lead off even from dreams which seem at first 
sight to have been completely interpreted, since their 
source and instigating wish have been discovered 
without difficulty’ (IV, 218). Analysis reveals still 
more thoughts always lying behind the apparently 
completely interpreted dream (IV, 279), leading, of 
course, to the claim that ‘there is at least one spot in 
every dream at which it is unplumbable – a navel, as 
it were, that is its point of contact with the unknown’ 
(IV, 111). Further and alternative interpretations are 
always possible, suggesting that the ‘intelligible wish’ 
revealed according to the archaeological model of 
interpretation may itself be the product of secondary 
revision. If so, the revealed ‘wish’, far from being 
what lies behind, might in fact be just another front. 
For the dream remains enigmatic and strange, even 
after all attempts at interpretation and translation. 
Or, if the interpretation of a dream as the fulfilment 
of a wish says what the dreams ‘says’ (Saxa loquuntur! 
‘Stones talk!’, as Freud writes in ‘The Aetiology of 
Hysteria’29), the dream nevertheless says more: 
The dream-thoughts to which we are led by 
interpre tation cannot, from the nature of things, 
have any definite endings; they are bound to branch 
out in every direction into the intricate network of 
our world of thought. It is at some point where this 
meshwork is particularly close that the dream-wish 
grows up, like a mushroom out of its mycelium. 
(V, 525) 
Temporally and formally finite, the dream refers 
infinitely; it has an infinity of reference. 
According to the archaeological model, only Bruch-
stücke of the dream are remembered, or the process of 
condensation crushes the coherent dream-thoughts 
into in-themselves meaningless pieces. But once the 
dream is acknowledged to contain a reference to the 
infinite, whatever is remembered – no matter how 
much or in what state – is a fragment in the Roman-
tic sense. Whatever remains of it is complete in 
itself, whilst at the same time intimating its essential 
incompletion, alluding to what cannot be presented 
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or what it cannot succeed in saying. Freud tends to 
treat each dream as a composite structure, emphasiz-
ing the pieces of the dream and their relation to the 
whole. Thus, in a footnote added to The Interpretation 
of Dreams in 1919, Freud describes the relation of the 
dream-element to its unconscious background as ‘a 
fragment [Stückchen] of that background, an allusion 
[Anspielung] to it … made quite incomprehensible by 
being isolated’ (V, 518). When, however, the dream in 
its entirety or the fragment of a dream are consid-
ered, in their different ways, as dream-wholes, their 
isolation from any context that would determine 
their meaning becomes, instead, the form of their 
completeness. This is apparent in dreams presented 
in their totality in The Interpretation of Dreams, no 
matter how short: ‘I. His elder brother was chaffing 
him. II. Two grown men were caressing each other 
with a homosexual purpose. III. His brother had sold 
the business of which he himself has looked forward 
to becoming the director’ (IV, 159). An interpretation 
is not necessary to understand that this dreamer, 
like A.W. Schlegel’s ‘poetical genius’, ‘know[s] a great 
deal more than he knows’.30 But it is also true of the 
enigmatic but insistent fragment: ‘“Father, don’t you 
see I’m burning?”’ (V, 509).
When the dream, complete in its incompletion, 
is thought as a fragment in the Romantic sense – a 
finished product that ‘cannot, from the nature of 
things, have any definite endings’ – its essential 
kinship with what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy call 
‘literature’ becomes obvious. Like the literary frag-
ment, it is a product of intellectual construction. Like 
the literary fragment, it invites interpretation whilst 
eluding it. It also, like the literary fragment, makes 
an impudent demand for attention considering its 
apparent deviance from the standards of classical 
composition. Further, what Baudrillard says of the 
fragment is true a fortiori of the dream: ‘Fragmentary 
writing is, ultimately, democratic writing. Each frag-
ment enjoys an equal distinction. The most banal one 
finds its exceptional reader. Each, in its turn, has its 
hour of glory.’31
However, that aspect of Freud’s The Interpretation 
of Dreams that allows us to see the ways in which the 
dream, also, is a fragment in the Romantic sense of 
the term frees the concept of the fragment from any 
disciplinary confinement. Frank’s disciplinary, philo-
sophical approach to early German Romanticism 
seems to treat the fragment as, ultimately, a literary 
issue. In this the very disjunction between philosophy 
and literature that Schlegel sought to overcome is 
ironically reinscribed. Even Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy’s literary-philosophical approach, which has, 
as it were, gone with the Romantic programme, 
nevertheless also tends in The Literary Absolute to 
restrict the concept of the fragment to the – albeit 
expanded – field of literature. Of course, the idea 
of what might now be called the transdisciplinarity 
of the fragment is already present in Schlegel, not 
just in the traversal of philosophy-literature, but also 
beyond: ‘I can only give you of myself, of my whole 
self no other tiny sample but a system of fragments, 
because I myself am like that.’32 But the example of 
the dream fragment also cuts across some of the dis-
tinctions that have tended to be used to distinguish 
the fragment from the Bruchstück. Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy distinguish, as we have seen, between 
what is ‘struck by incompletion’ and what ‘aims for 
fragmentation for its own sake … a determinate and 
deliberate statement’.33 Wanning Harries similarly 
distinguishes between the involuntary and the vol-
untary fragment.34 The dream fragment, however, 
which is already interpretation, is neither voluntary 
nor involuntary but both. It is at once constructed 
as a fragment and struck by incompletion; deliberate 
and unplanned. As such it is not only an example of 
a fragment in the Romantic sense, but it complicates 
our picture of the meaning of that concept as it might 
have any actuality for us today. 
The dream’s the thing
To recap: it has been suggested that there are two, 
competing, views of dreams in The Interpretation of 
Dreams. First, according to the archeological model, 
the dream is divided into two: what we can call 
the dream proper (what is actually dreamed, the 
experienced dream, theoretically determined as the 
manifest content available to sleeping and waking 
consciousness) and the meaning or significance of 
the dream (theoretically determined as the uncon-
scious, latent content). In this model the dream-
work (the processes of condensation, displacement, 
transformation of abstract ideas into images and the 
equivocal process of secondary revision) transforms 
the latent content (the dream-thoughts) into the 
dream (manifest content) and the theory of dreams 
is reducible to the defence of the thesis that ‘a dream 
is a (disguised) fulfilment of a (suppressed or repressed) 
wish’ (IV, 161).On this view the experience of the 
dream proper is, paradoxically, the least important 
thing in the theory of dreams. The aim of interpre-
tation is, as we have already seen, to ‘reconstruct 
… not, it is true, the dream – which is in any case a 
matter of no importance – but all the dream-thoughts’ 
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(IV, 517; emphasis added). For Freud the problem of 
dreams was separate from any investigation into, 
for example, the physiology of sleep. Even so, being-
asleep was for him a specific condition for dreams, 
lowering the guard of the censor somewhat and, in 
reducing the stimuli of external perception, opening 
the psychic space for hallucinatory perception. The 
dream-thoughts require the disguise brought about 
by the dream-work to the extent that they are such 
as would be repressed in waking thought, but are 
also disguised in dreams with the specific aim of 
not disrupting sleep. Thus if Freud ascribed a func-
tion to dreaming, it was the function of protecting 
sleep.35 The combination of the ascription of this 
function and the wish-fulfilment thesis makes up 
the received view of Freud’s theory of dreams. To 
the extent that this was proposed as a new, specifi-
cally psychoanalytic theory, developed along with the 
concepts and vocabulary of this new science (in the 
German sense), it sums up the disciplinary psycho-
analytic concept of the dream in The Interpretation 
of Dreams. And it is very widely attacked, both inside 
and outside of psychoanalysis.
This view distinguishes between unconscious 
dream-thoughts and the conscious dream-form; 
it distinguishes between the constructions of the 
dream-work and the analysis undertaken in the 
work of interpretation. As interpretation makes 
what was unconscious conscious, the dream itself is 
conceived as something to be dissolved, its total form 
an appearance to be unmasked. Notwithstanding 
the evident literary and imaginative nature of the 
dream, the relation between dream and interpreta-
tion, on this model, is not unlike that of the relation 
between error and correction. The dream as dreamed 
is something to be overcome.
However, the second view of dreams in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, thought according to the 
Romantic idea of the fragment, accepts none of these 
distinctions or conceptions. On this second view, 
‘the dream’s the thing’; it is not a false front. The 
fact that it says more than it says is more important 
than any one thing that it might be made to say 
through the process of interpretation.36 This is not to 
say that all interpretation is rendered otiose. Rather, 
interpretation is reconceived, in several respects. This 
is, to begin with, a consequence of the nature of the 
dream itself:
Not only are the elements of the dream deter-
mined by the dream-thoughts many times over 
[mehrfach determiniert], but the individual dream-
thoughts are represented in the dream by several 
elements. Associative paths lead from one element 
of the dream to several dream-thoughts, and from 
one dream-thought to several elements of the 
dream. Thus a dream is not constructed by each 
individual dream-thought, or a group of dream-
thoughts, finding (in abbreviated form) separate 
representations in the content of the dream … a 
dream is constructed, rather, by the whole mass 
of dream-thoughts being subjected to a sort of 
manipulative process [einer gewissen Bearbeitung] 
in which those elements which have the most nu-
merous and strongest supports acquire the right 
of entry into the dream-content … the elements 
of the dream are constructed out of the whole 
mass of dream-thoughts and each one of those 
elements is shown to have been determined many 
times over in relation to the dream-thoughts. 
(IV, 284)
The relation of interpretation to such a complex 
structure is less an overlay or addition than the ‘com-
pletion’ of one of its threads, just as with the Early 
Romantic concept of criticism which ‘completes’ 
the work. The dream interpretation then becomes 
a fragment in its own right. Further interpretations 
make up more fragments, which together make 
up a system of fragments, which is, again, itself a 
fragment: 
Aren’t all systems individuals just as all individuals 
are systems at least in embryo and tendency? Isn’t 
every real entity historical? Aren’t there individuals 
who contain within themselves whole systems of 
individuals?37
This alternative view of dreams is thus one in which 
the distinction between dream-work (construction/
production) and interpretation has already collapsed. 
On the archaeological model, in which the dream-
work and its interpretation are separate processes, 
the idea of interpretation is restricted to the analytic 
situation (both formally in the clinic and informally, 
as with Freud’s own self-analysis or the lay psycho-
analytic attempt on one’s own or others’ dreams). 
It perhaps owes more to the abandoned practice of 
the analyst informing the patient of the meaning 
of their dream or symptom than Freud is aware.38 
The concept of interpretation in The Interpretation 
of Dreams does not, however, allow itself to be thus 
restricted. For example, explaining the alteration 
in the form of the external and internal somatic 
stimulus as it appears in the dream, and emphasiz-
ing that this is the result of a psychically motivated 
act (rather than a mechanical effect), Freud writes 
of ‘the perverse and capricious manner in which 
external stimuli are interpreted [die Schiefheit und 
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Launenhaftigkeit in der Deutung des äußeren Reizes]’ 
in dreams, when (as other phenomena attest) ‘the 
sleeping mind’ is perfectly capable of making ‘the 
correct interpretation [die richtige Deutung]’ (IV, 234). 
Thus, the dream-work is already itself the work of 
interpretation.
However, the absolute point of indifference 
between dream-work and interpretation is located 
in the process that Freud calls ‘secondary revision’, 
die sekundäre Bearbeitung. This is, for Freud, that 
part of the dream-work that attempts to endow the 
dream with a veneer of meaningfulness. But Freud 
identifies it with the tendency in waking thought to 
‘establish order’ in perceptual experience, to ‘make it 
conform to our expectations of an intelligible whole’ 
(V, 499). Dreams subject to secondary revision ‘might 
be said to have been already interpreted once [schon 
einmal gedeutet worden sind], before being submitted 
to waking interpretation [ehe wir sie im Wachen der 
Deutung unterziehen]’, but ‘waking interpretations’ 
(of dreams, plays; in fact anything) too can be the 
products of the same process (V, 490).
Explicitly, Freud identifies secondary revision with 
what we might call bad interpretation, which for 
him means misinterpretation. It has, he writes, the 
function that ‘the poet maliciously ascribes to phil-
osophers; it fills up the gaps in the dream-structure 
with shreds and patches’ (V, 490). The poet in ques-
tion here, as Strachey’s editorial work tells us, is 
Heine – specifically Poem LVIII of ‘Die Heimkehr’. 
The poem is not quoted in The Interpretation of 
Dreams, but lines from it are included in the 1933 New 
Introductory Lectures, lecture XXXV on ‘The Question 
of a Weltanschauung’. The idea of ‘an intellectual 
construction which solves all the problems of our 
existence uniformly on the basis of one overriding 
hypothesis’, which, accordingly, leaves no question 
unanswered, is one that answers to an ‘emotional 
demand’ or a ‘wish’, but is fulfilled only as a pro-
gramme, an ideal (XXII, 158–9). However, philosophy 
clings to the illusion of really being able to ‘present 
a picture of the universe which is without gaps and 
coherent’ (XXII, 160). Freud then quotes the last two 
lines of Heine’s verse: 
Zu fragmentarisch ist Welt und Leben! 
Ich will mich zum deutschen Professor begeben. 
Der weiß das Leben zusammenzusetzen, 
Und er macht ein verständlich System daraus; 
mit seinen Nachtmützen und Schlafrockfetzen 
Stopft er die Lücken des Weltenbaus.39
Life and the world’s too fragmented for me!
A German professor can give me the key.
He puts like in order with skill magisterial,
Builds a national system for better or worse;
With nightcap and dressing-gown scraps as 
material
He chinks up the holes in the Universe.40
This may or may not echo Schlegel’s Critical Fragments 
103:
many a work of art whose coherence is never 
questioned is, as the artist knows quite well 
himself, not a complete work but a fragment, 
or one or more fragments, a mass, a plan [nur 
Bruchstück, eins oder mehre, Masse, Anlage]. But so 
powerful is the instinct for unity in mankind that 
the author himself will often bring something to a 
kind of completion at least directly with the form 
which simply can’t be made a whole or a unit; 
often quite imaginatively and yet completely un-
naturally. The worst thing about it is that whatever 
is draped about the solid, really existent fragments 
[Stücken] in the attempt to mug up a semblance of 
unity consists largely of dyed rags. And if these are 
touched up cleverly and deceptively, and tastefully 
displayed, then that’s all the worse.41 
In all three cases (Schlegel, Heine, Freud) what 
is perhaps being described here is precisely that 
conception of interpretation associated with the 
archeological model of dreams and the idea of a 
fragment as a Bruchstück – something upon which to 
reconstruct a lost whole. This idea of interpretation 
actually betrays an intolerance of the fragmentary, 
never more evident than in Freud’s ‘Fragment of an 
Analysis of a Case of Hysteria’, a companion piece 
to The Interpretation of Dreams.42 But without the 
presumptions of the archeological model, and in 
league with the Romantic concept of the fragment, 
the equivocal status of secondary revision – cutting 
across the distinction between dream and waking 
thought, across dream construction and interpreta-
tion, across ‘work’ and ‘criticism’ – refers us to a 
much richer concept of interpretation. The concept 
of interpretation associated with the archeological 
model is one of the disciplinary concepts of psycho-
analytic ‘interpretation’. That associated with the 
alternative model, in which the (dream-)work and 
interpretation are part of the same work, is, on the 
other hand, a transdisciplinary concept of interpre-
tation. The ‘application’ of psychoanalytic theory 
in other disciplinary contexts would make use of 
the former; indeed it would be an example of it. 
The latter reveals the transdisciplinary potential of 
psychoanalysis itself. It is one of the achievements 
of psychoanalysis as transdisciplinarity: its romantic 
transdisciplinarity, we might say.
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